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Why would anyone object to 
someone choosing to be smarter, 
better focused, and more pro-
ductive? Surely cognitive enhancement has 
much to offer individuals and society, and 
legal dispensers of methylphenidate (Ritalin) 
should not object. Unfortunately, the case 
for healthy people taking this drug is not so 
straightforward. Doctors routinely decide 
whether to intervene based on a calculation 
of relative risks and benefits. Here, the risks 
outweigh the benefits.
Some doctors might reflexively think 
that the answer to the target question is 
an obvious “no.” After all, doctors are in 
the business of treating disease and not 
enhancing normal abilities. On scrutiny, 
this distinction proves to be unreliable, 
particularly when conditions lack clear 
categorical boundaries. For example, if 
individuals of short stature can be “treated” 
with growth hormone,1 does it matter if 
they are short because of a growth hor-
mone deficiency or because of other rea-
Many healthy students 
are thought to use 
methylphenidate (Ritalin) 
and other chemical cognitive enhancers 
to improve academic performance.1 The 
arguments against their being permitted 
so to do have not been persuasive.2 The 
crucial ethical question is whether this is a 
matter for regret or celebration.
Ethical dimension
Suppose a university were to set out 
deliberately to improve the mental 
capacities of its students; suppose its stated 
aims were to ensure that students left the 
university more intelligent and learned 
than when they arrived. Suppose they 
further claimed that not only could they 
achieve this but that their students would 
be more intelligent and mentally alert 
than any students in history. What should 
our reaction be?
We might be sceptical, but if the 
claims could be sustained, should we 
be pleased? Would we welcome such a 
breakthrough and want our children to 
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sons?2 Furthermore, the widespread use 
of cosmetic surgery to enhance normal 
physical attributes shows that many doc-
tors, given the right incentives and cultural 
framework,3 become comfortable with non-
therapeutic  interventions.4
Questionable benefit
The most obvious reason to object to using 
methylphenidate for healthy enhance-
ments is that the cognitive benefits are 
minimal5 and the medical risks are not. 
In the United States, the Food and Drug 
Administration gave methylphenidate a 
“black box,” the most alarming of possi-
ble warnings, because of its high potential 
for abuse and dependence and its risks of 
sudden death and serious cardiovascular 
adverse events.6 Furthermore, the incidence 
of serious cardiac arrhythmias is likely to 
be higher in older people with incipient 
cardiovascular disease, one group that is 
likely to use the drugs to enhance perform-
ance.  Non-physicians calling for responsible 
use of methylphenidate by healthy people7 
underappreciate this risk.8 
Besides medical side effects, there are also 
possible cognitive trade-offs. For example, 
go to such a university? We ought to want 
this. It is, after all, part of what education 
is supposed to be for. And if the gains 
in cognitive functioning were significant 
and the costs commensurate we would 
probably want them for our children and 
want to see them more widely adopted in 
education.
Now suppose, as indeed has already 
happened, several drugs had been shown 
to improve cognitive performance and 
had been proved to be safe for use in 
children. What should our reaction be? 
Would it be unethical to use these drugs in 
healthy people to enhance performance? 
Would it be ethical not to do so?2
Risks and benefits
Methylphenidate and several other so 
called chemical cognitive enhancers have 
been shown to significantly improve 
cognitive functioning and have proved 
safe in clinical contexts.3 Safe always 
means safe enough, and since no drugs 
are free of side effects, that always means 
that the consumer has judged the risks of 
adverse effects worth taking, given the 
probable benefits. Methylphenidate has 
been judged safe enough to be widely 
used in children and young people with 
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greater focus from long term use of methyl-
phenidate could plausibly produce a loss in 
creativity, which generally requires a loosen-
ing of mental boundaries.9 Such trade-offs 
are rarely considered or investigated.
In considering benefits, we might postu-
late that being smart is good for the world. 
Many smart people would like to believe that 
products of smartness confer clear benefits to 
society. Perhaps the brightest getting brighter 
would produce trickle down enhancements 
into our communities. But the fact that very 
smart people generating complicated mod-
els to distribute financial risk contributed to 
the current global economic crisis should at 
least give us pause. Being smarter does not 
mean being wiser. Furthermore, this dubious 
benefit is counterbalanced by two other risks. 
These are risks of expanding social inequities 
and inviting coercion.10
Equity and choice
Drug enhancements will be available dispro-
portionately to those with financial means. If 
enhancements are helpful in getting ahead in 
a competitive world, then the haves would 
avail themselves of yet another advantage 
over the have nots. Clearly, many  inequities 
in education, material goods, and social 
class, not to mention more fundamental 
inequities in health care, nutrition, shelter, 
and safety, already give the socioeconomi-
cally lucky disproportionate advantages. 
However, acknowledging the existence of 
disturbing inequities does not justify blithely 
adding more.
Matters of choice can evolve into forces of 
coercion. Implicit pressures to better one’s 
position in some perceived social order 
would find a natural conduit in cognitive 
enhancements. Such pressures increase in 
“winner take all”  environments, in which 
more people compete for fewer and big-
ger prizes.11 Professionals in the US work 
60, 80, or more than 100 hours a week to 
the detriment of health and hearth. Chil-
dren at high end preparatory schools take 
 methylphenidate and its analogues in epi-
demic proportions.12 This trend is grow-
ing among students13 and even among 
 professors.14 To not take advantage of 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD) over a long period. Since the 
disorder is not usually life threatening and 
the beneficial therapeutic effects largely 
depend on the same properties that make 
the drug an enhancing intervention, those 
same benefits will also justify its use from 
the safety perspective in healthy adults, 
who (presumably) value those effects as 
much as do those with ADHD. Moreover, 
methylphenidate has proved safe enough 
to be ethical to use in research with 
healthy subjects to test cognitive effects, 
where the use is clearly elective rather 
than therapeutic.
The drug’s significant advantages 
include enhanced executive functioning, 
enhanced study skills, and improvement 
in the focusing of attention and in 
the manipulation of information.2 As 
Farah and colleagues have noted: “Our 
regulatory agencies determine what 
constitutes a sufficiently careful search 
for side effects and what side effects are 
acceptable in view of a drug’s benefits 
. . . we see no reason why the same 
approach cannot be applied [in the case 
of neurocognitive enhancement]”.4 This 
would be one reasonable approach to 
safety. However, here I am interested in 
the question of whether there are any 
principled ethical objections to the use of 
chemical cognitive enhancers in healthy 
individuals, not with the definition of 
safety.
Human nature
Clear thinking on the issue of human 
enhancement has been bedevilled by the 
issue of doping in sport. Sport, however, 
is not a matter of life and death, even 
though some might agree with the football 
manager Bill Shankly that it is “far 
more important than that.” The wrong 
of performance enhancers in sport, if 
there is one, is that such substances are 
almost universally banned by the rules 
of competition; using them is therefore 
cheating. But absent the ban, absent the 
cheating.
It is not rational to be against human 
enhancement; humans are creatures that 
result from an enhancement process 
called evolution (mixed as its benefits 
are) and moreover are inveterate self 
improvers in every conceivable way.
Synthetic sunshine (firelight, 
lamplight, and electric light) is just 
one accepted example of a valuable 
enhancement technology which, 
like such others as written language, 
education, physical exercise, and diet, 
creates problems of justice as well as 
the side effects of use and overuse. 
And beneficial neural changes have 
been reported for reading,5 education,6 
physical exercise,7 and diet.8 How then 
are drugs ethically distinct? Before 
synthetic sunshine people slept when it 
was dark and worked in the light of day. 
With the advent of synthetic sunshine 
work and social life could continue 
into and through the night, creating 
competitive pressures and incentives 
for those able or willing to use it to their 
advantage. The solution, however, was 
not to outlaw synthetic sunshine but to 
regulate working hours and improve 
access. The same is, or will be, true of 
chemical cognitive enhancers.
Competing interests: None declared.
Cite this as: BMJ 2009;338:b1955
enhancements might mean being left 
behind. Coercion can also become explicit, 
as might occur in the military,15 if superior 
performance by a few is deemed neces-
sary for the greater good. Pilots and police 
might face similar pressures. Closer to BMJ 
readers, residents might be forced to take 
enhancements after being on call to mitigate 
cognitive deficits brought on by sleep depri-
vation. Perhaps doctors older than 50 would 
be required to pharmacologically stave off 
their fraying cognitive edges.
Endorsing the legal non-therapeutic use of 
methylphenidate or other cognitive enhanc-
ers now is premature. The efficacy and risk 
of enhancers in healthy people needs to be 
researched adequately. This information 
needs to be disseminated broadly. Doctors, 
educators, and regulators need to articulate 
professional normative positions on the issue. 
Enforceable policies to minimise disparities 
and protect individuals need to be estab-
lished. Until such preparations are made, it 
is not acceptable to recommend that healthy 
people take drugs to enhance performance.
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